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Abstract—The multimedia communication is rapidly converg-
ing towards Voice over Internet – commonly known as Voice
over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is
the standard used for session signaling in VoIP. Crafty attackers
can launch a number of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on a
SIP based VoIP infrastructure that can severely compromise
its reliability. In contrast, little work is done to analyze the
robustness and reliability of SIP severs under DoS attacks. In this
paper, we show that the robustness and reliability of generic SIP
servers is inadequate than commonly perceived. We have done
our study using a customized analysis tool that has the ability
to synthesize and launch different types of attacks. We have
integrated the tool in a real SIP test bed environment to measure
the performance of SIP servers. Our measurements show that a
standard SIP server can be easily overloaded by sending simple
call requests. We define the performance metrics to measure
the effects of flooding attacks on real time services - VoIP in
SIP environment – and show the results on different SIP server
implementations. Our results also provide insight into resources’
usage by SIP servers under flooding attacks. Moreover, we show
that how a well known open source SIP server can be crashed
through ‘INVITE of Death’ - a malformed SIP packet maliciously
crafted by our tool.
I. INTRODUCTION
The global communication market is experiencing a rapid
increase in demand for novel Internet based multimedia ap-
plications. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application
layer signaling protocol used for establishing, controlling and
annihilating the media sessions of these applications. The
common services of SIP in multimedia application include
network gaming, interactive TV, Voice over IP (VoIP), PC
clients, multiparty conferencing, video on demand, presence
and instant messaging [1].
A recent market survey indicates that VoIP accounts for
49.7% of total voice traffic at the end of year 2007 [2]. With
this level of penetration of Internet telephony, SIP servers are
becoming a hot pursuit for imposters and intruders. A recent
survey by SANS Institute supports our argument by suggesting
that SIP servers are among the SANS top 20 security risks
[3]. Another study shows that VoIP servers are among the
top 5 emerging cyber security threats for the year 2009 [4].
However, robustness of SIP servers against different types
of threats is not well-studied or understood. We, therefore,
undertake an empirical study to evaluate the performance and
robustness of different implementations of SIP proxy servers
under DoS attacks.
The purpose of our study is to help both VoIP vendors
and academia better understand different vulnerabilities in the
existing SIP servers and how adequately they are protected
against them. The mitigation of DoS attack is not within the
scope of this paper. We believe robustness analysis of SIP
servers is an important step towards designing DoS protection
strategies for SIP servers. In our study, we specifically try to
investigate a number of relevant issues:
• What is the impact of simple DoS attacks on the perfor-
mance of SIP proxy servers?
• Are existing well-known SIP servers robust against
emerging threats?
• What is the ‘breaking point’1 of a SIP server after which
a complete DoS occurs?
• How realistic is the threat of malformed packets attack?
In order to systematically conduct our investigative study, we
have developed a tool that can launch two types of attacks:
(1) flooding of call requests at different rates to launch DoS,
and (2) generating malformed packets that contain mutation of
strings, crafted on specific positions, to exploit vulnerabilities
in parsing or implementation codes. Our tool uses SIPp – an
open source SIP traffic generator – for generating call requests
[5]. The tool automatically generates performance reports that
provide two types of performance metrics: (1) SIP related
metrics help us in understanding the impact of performance
degradation on VoIP calls, and (2) system related metrics that
are useful for analyzing the impact of attacks on the hardware
resources like CPU usage.
We have selected four well-known SIP proxy servers for our
robustness study. We use transactional stateful proxying mode
[6] of the servers. We deploy one server at a time in our real
test bed and then launch, using our tool, different types of
attacks on it. Using the report generation module of our tool,
we analyze the performance degradation of each server that
provides the understanding of behavior of a given SIP server
under DoS attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
briefly introduces the threat model used to study the robustness
of SIP server, the different performance metrics that we define
to do a comparative study of the robustness of a SIP server and
1We define breaking point as an attack scenario in which only 50% of the
requested calls are completed.
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(a) Benign Call Model (b) INVITE Flood
Fig. 1. SIP Call Models
discussion on our attack synthesis and analysis tool. In Section
III, we discuss the real testbed we have deployed for our
experiments. We discuss and analyze results of our robustness
study in Section IV. In Section V, we briefly describe the
related work in the field of vulnerability analysis of servers.
Finally, we conclude our paper with an outlook to our future
research.
II. SECURITY EVALUATION, METRICS AND ATTACK
SYNTHESIS/ANALYSIS TOOL
In this section, we first describe the security threats related
to SIP servers. Then, we define metrics for measuring the
robustness of the SIP servers under these security threats.
Afterwards, we describe our tool that is capable of launching
these attacks and calculating the performance of the SIP
servers in terms of these metrics.
A. SIP Security Threats
The easiest way to launch Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
on a SIP proxy server is to flood it with a large number of
unwanted call requests. As a result, its resources – internal
memory buffers, CPU and bandwidth – are exhausted and it
is unable to provide service even to the legitimate users (see
Figure 1). The requirements of resources is dependent on the
fact whether SIP server is configured for stateless or stateful
mode and is using authentication or not [7].
Moreover, SIP is also prone to malformed message attack in
which attackers generate non-standard SIP messages, that are
intelligently crafted to exploit vulnerabilities in the SIP parser
or in poor implementation of a SIP server. An imposter can,
using a malformed packet, overflow the specific string buffers,
add large number of token characters and modify fields in an
illegal fashion. As a result, a server is tricked to reach an
undefined state, which can lead to call processing delays, an
unauthorized access and a complete denial of service. We also
show how an intelligently crafted single malformed message
can crash a server. We call it Invite of Death.
In our experiments the intensity of flood attacks varies from
1000 INVITE packets/sec to 10000 INVITE packets/sec.
Figure 1 shows the SIP call models of benign and INVITE
flood scenarios. The parsing attacks are launched with the help
of malformed SIP packets generated by our tool.
B. Performance Metrics
The motivation of identifying and selecting relevant per-
formance metrics is very important for our study because:
(1) they help us in examining that how different SIP servers
behave under DoS attacks, (2) they help academia to better
understand the severity of DoS in SIP environment and a
VoIP vendor to do risk analysis of his/her business operations,
and (3) they provide information from an end user perspective
about the quality of service that they should expect from a SIP
server in case of DoS attacks. We, therefore, propose two types
of metrics: (1) SIP based metrics, and (2) SIP independent
system metrics. SIP based metrics define the quality of service
from an end user perspective. If these metrics are degraded in
DoS attacks, it would mean service unavailability to the end
users. In real world scenario it would result in VoIP customers
dissatisfaction that would indirectly lead to loss of revenue and
creditability of the vendor. On the other hand, if system metrics
are degraded, it can lead to a complete denial of service which
of course poses a significant threat.
We define the SIP based metrics as:
Call Completion Ratio (CCR). The ratio of the number of
benign calls2 that are successfully completed during an attack
scenario to the number of calls successfully completed in no-
attack scenario.
Call Establishment Latency (CEL). The average delay
that a SIP client experiences between dialing of a number and
successfully establishing the call. Specifically it is the average
delay between sending of an INVITE request message by a
SIP client and receiving of corresponding 200 OK response
from the SIP server (see Figure 1).
Call Rejection Ratio (CRR). The ratio of the number of
benign calls rejected by a SIP server during an attack scenario
to the number of calls rejected in normal no-attack scenario.
The metric determines the effective loss of potential resources
of a SIP server under attack scenarios. It also represents the
fraction of SIP clients unable to get services from the server.
Number of Retransmitted Requests (NRR). The number
of request messages which are retransmitted due to server
timeout or network congestion. The metric models the conges-
tion level in a network because of large number of INVITE
packets. If NRR increases significantly during an attack, CCR,
CEL and CRR will also degrade.
We now define SIP independent system metrics that show
us whether a machine, hosting a SIP server, is able to meet
requirements of SIP clients. In extreme attack scenarios, a
machine might become unresponsive or the operating system
might crash. These metrics are:
CPU usage. The average CPU usage of the machine hosting
a SIP server.
CPU interrupts rate. The rate at which different interrupts
are received by the CPU.
2We use the term benign calls to represent the calls requested by legitimate
users.
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Interrupt handling time. The average time taken by the
CPU to service these interrupts.
C. Attack Synthesis and Analysis Tool
Our attack synthesis and analysis tool3 consists of three
important modules: (1) client configuration module, (2) attack
generation module, and (3) report generation module. The
client configuration module configures the SIP clients to
generate normal call load on a SIP server. The clients call each
other randomly through the SIP server. Once connected, they
start variable length voice sessions consisting of RTP traffic.
1) Client Configuration Module: The reasons to generate
a normal call flow on the server are twofold: (1) to create a
real-world normal call scenario for a SIP server, (2) to system-
atically analyze the degradation in performance – experienced
by legitimate users – under attack scenarios. The simulated
clients generate calls randomly with an average load of 3000
calls per min. The tool configures the SIP client instances on
separate machines with the parameters like call rate, media
port, time out value, remote host parameters and IP address.
2) Attack Generation Module: The attack generation mod-
ule in our tool can launch flooding or malformed packet
attacks. The tool is capable of generating 9600 malformed
packets of various categories: Null mutations, Space mutation,
Utf-8 invalid character mutation, Escape characters mutation,
Token string mutation and ASCII characters mutation. Muta-
tions are carried on every possible position in the SIP header.
Similarly our module launches DoS attack by flooding large
number of unwanted INVITE messages to SIP server.
3) Report Generation Module: The job of the report gen-
eration module is to gather statistics from the SIP clients and
the server. Each SIP client generates a report in the csv
file format during the experiment. Similarly on the server
machine the statistics of hardware resources are also calculated
and logged in realtime. Once an experiment finishes, report
generation module communicates with SIP clients, SUT, the
attacking node, and generates the report of above-mentioned
performance metrics.
III. EXPERIMENTAL TESTBED
Now, we describe our experimental testbed that we have
used to evaluate the performance of different SIP servers
under different types of attack scenarios. Figure 2 shows the
architecture of testbed used in our experiments. Note that the
clients – the caller and the called parties – are instantiated
on separate machines to make accurate measurements of
performance metrics. The User Agent Clients (UACs) initiate
the calls; while the User Agent Servers (UASs) are the SIP
clients that receive the call from UACs and start the dialogue.
All SIP related traffic is proxied through the SIP servers while
the RTP traffic is routed directly between the UASs and UACs
and has no impact on System Under Test (SUT). The flooding
and parsing attacks are separately launched from an attacker
node. To conclude, our testbed consist of five components: (1)
3http://ims-bisf.nexginrc.org/SIPTool.php/
Fig. 2. Experimental Testbed
TABLE I
SIP SERVERS USED IN EXPERIMENT
Server Name Version License O.S
OpenSER 1.1.1 GNU GPL Linux
PartySIP 2.2.2 GNU GPL Linux
OpenSBC 1.1.5 MPL,GPL,LGPL Linux
MjServer 1.6 GNU GPL Linux
SIP User Agent Clients (UACs), (2) SIP User Agent Servers
(UASs), (3) Imposter nodes, (4) SIP server, and (5) Analysis
Machine.
A. SIP UACs and UASs
The benign users of the system are simulated as SIP UACs
(callers) and UASs (callees). These clients are implemented
using a modified version of SIPp. We have adapted SIPp in
order to make it inter operable with our custom analysis tool.
B. Attacker Nodes
We have implemented attacker nodes as bots running on
separate machines. These bots are implemented in C++ and
are capable of launching DoS attacks on a SIP server4. We
can configure and manage them from our analysis tool.
C. SIP Proxy Servers
We have selected four SIP servers for our robustness study.
The criteria for selection of servers are: high performance,
wide deployment and public availability. Table I shows the
list of servers [8], [9], [10], [11], their version, license type
and the operating system on which they are deployed. The
selected servers are well-known and offer basic features of
SIP: proxying, registration and redirection. The servers are
compliant with the IETF’s standard SIP specifications [6]. We
configure stateful proxying without authentication in our ex-
periments because this is the commonly used configuration by
VoIP service providers. This configuration helps them in doing
4Currently, these bots can launch only SIP flood and parsing attacks.
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Fig. 3. Percentage CCR vs. Attack Rate
Fig. 4. NRR vs. Attack Rate
accounting and billing on a per call basis. Other proxying
scenarios are simple extensions of the stateful scenario [6].
D. Attack Synthesis and Analysis Machine
This machine is a high-end system which hosts our attack
synthesis and analysis tool. It controls the UACs, UASs and
the attacker node. It also monitors the state of the SIP servers
and calculates performance metrics for the servers.
E. Hardware Specifications
The testbed has been designed in our IMS laboratory
with an isolated network. The experiments are done on an
isolated network to factor out unwanted background traffic
and minimize interference from other processes. The machines
hosting UACs, UASs, the SIP servers (SUT), and the intruder
nodes are Intel(R) 2.20 GHz processors with 2 GB RAM
and 240 GB disk drives. All machines are running Linux
Fedora Core 8 with a kernel version 2.6.23.1. The machines
are connected to a 3 COM Gigabit switch.
IV. ROBUSTNESS RESULT OF GENERIC SIP
SERVERS
We now present and analyze the robustness of different
SIP servers in terms of CCR, CRR and NRR metrics under
different attack scenarios. The results of our experiments
show that DoS attacks significantly degrade these metrics
which can undermine the ability of a VoIP service operator
to continue its operations. We expect CCR to decrease, CRR
to increase and consequently NRR would also increase with
an increase in the intensity of the attack rate. Degradation of
these performance metrics is a direct measure of the threat
level on VoIP infrastructure of an operator by an imposter.
Consequently, the operator can do risk analysis of the potential
loss in revenue at this threat level.
Fig. 5. Percentage CRR vs. Attack Rate
Fig. 6. CEL vs. Attack Rate
We have shown different performance metrics under attack,
obtained from our analysis tool, in Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and
9. Now we discuss the impact of DoS attacks on each metric.
A. Analysis of CCR, CEL, CRR and NRR
In Figure 3, we plot CCR (in percentage) of four servers
for different flooding rates of INVITE packets. (Note that
the bar graph of different servers follows the same order as
shown in legend.) Recall that CCR is a measure of successfully
established calls under attack scenarios. In contrast, CRR
in Figure 5 shows the benign calls that are rejected during
an attack scenario. An attack rate of zero on x-axes of
all figures shows normal operating scenarios without any
attack. It is interesting to note that an attack rate of just
1000 INVITE packets/sec reduces CCR of OpenSER and
MjServer to less than 20% (or 80% CRR as shown in Figure
5). This level of degradation in performance in effect is a
successful DoS attack. Similarly in Figure 4 we see that
retransmission requests jump to 100 and 1000 for OpenSER
and MjServer respectively once CCR reduces (note that Y-
axis is on the logarithmic scale). This is because 80% of
customers receive the busy signal and hence redial the number.
Another important observation in Figure 3 is that OpenSBC
is robust to DoS attacks till 4000 INVITE packets/sec; while
PartySIP can counter 8000 INVITE packets/sec. Note that
NRR of OpenSER is less compared with that of PartySIP
even though OpenSER has high CRR and low CCR compared
with PartySIP. We investigated the issue and found out that
OpenSER replied with the server busy (5xx response) once
it observed high load. Our simulated client simply rejects the
call once it receives 5xx response message from the server.
From Figure 6, we see that the call establishment latency
initially rises exponentially and then achieves a steady state
value. If we compare it with Figures 3 and 5, we conclude
that the ratio of established calls almost reaches to zero under
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Fig. 7. Average CPU usage vs. Attack Rate
Fig. 8. CPU Interrupt Rate vs. Attack Rate
high attacks rates, hence only a very small fraction of calls are
established. But the established calls have acceptable latency.
Since CEL is measured on successfully established calls only;
therefore, MjServer, OpenSBC and OpenSER have less data
points in Figure 6 compared with PartySIP.
To conclude, it is obvious from Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 that
none of the servers is capable of defending itself against DoS
attacks. But some servers like PartySIP are definitely better
designed and robust against high attack rates. An imposter
needs to select an appropriate rate for INVITE flood attacks
to successfully launch a DoS attack on a given SIP server.
B. CPU usage, Interrupt Rate and Interrupt Handling Time
We now discuss the impact of system parameters under
attacks. We see in Figure 7 that the CPU usage increases
exponentially with an increase in the attack rate. Just for
an attack rate of 1000 INVITE packets/sec, the usage in-
creases from 1%, 3%, 23% and 40% for OpenSER, PartySIP,
OpenSBC and MjServer respectively to 40%, 80%, 81% and
82% respectively. This further confirms that servers start suf-
fering from DoS attack because CPU is kept busy processing
malicious call requests that leaves little time for processing
legitimate calls. We further investigated the reasons behind
such a dramatic increase in the CPU usage. An important
outcome is that even at an attack rate of 1000 INVITE
packets/sec, the number of hardware interrupts exponentially
increases from few hundreds to few thousands (see Figure
8). As a result, the servers are spending most of their time
in processing the interrupts. This also corresponds to our
findings in Figure 7. It is interesting to note that the interrupt
service time of MjServer rises exponentially with an increase
in the attack rate. While other three servers show graceful
degradation in service time till the point they completely crash.
We note that OpenSER has the lowest CPU usage even though
it has largest number of interrupts. This is explained by the fact
Fig. 9. Interrupt Handling Time vs. Attack Rate
that it refuses to accept more call requests above a predefined
threshold value. Therefore, the total number of active call
sessions remains within a predetermined limit. Afterwards
OpenSER simply sends server busy response to all requests.
We argue that Figures 7, 8 and 9 provide valuable insights
that how these metrics can be utilized to design and develop
an intelligent host based intrusion detection system for SIP.
C. Parsing Attack Result
Another important contribution of our work is the parsing
attack generation module, which has the capability to automat-
ically create malformed messages. The malformed messages
exploit vulnerabilities in the SIP parser, as a result, a server can
be crashed by a single packet. We call it as Invite of Death.
We generated 9600 intelligently crafted malformed packets.
We have successfully crashed OpenSBC server on a number
of occasions with our malformed packets. One of the example
packets that crashed OpenSBC server is shown in Figure
10. Note that overflow of colons at the end of “Via” field
represents a malformed syntax in the packet. The vulnerability
highlights the weak parsing technique in the implementation of
OpenSBC. We have already reported the vulnerabilities to the
development team of OpenSBC5. They have now redesigned
their parser in which the parsing vulnerabilities are removed
and new version is released as 1.1.5-82. This shows the utility
of our attack generation module.
In comparison we have not been able to crash OpenSER,
PartySIP and MjServer. The reason being the best coding
practices adopted during their implementation. For example in
OpenSER several parsing operations – using UTF-8 encoding
– take constant time during parsing of the string because it
also takes as an input the length of a string along with the
string. Furthermore it “uses lazy parsing to only parse those
headers necessary rather than naively parsing all of them.
Last but not least, it incrementally parses only needed fields
within a header” [7]. MjServer generates certain type of string
exceptions on receiving the malformed packets; however, we
are unable to crash it.
V. RELATED WORK
The reliable performance of SIP server is critical under
DoS attacks. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical
study is done to analyze robustness of SIP servers against
5The advisory for this vulnerability is available at [12].
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Fig. 10. Malformed Packet (crashes OpenSBC)
DoS attacks. As a result, very little is known or understood
about robustness of SIP servers. The authors of [13] have
empirically evaluated the SMTP servers against DoS attacks.
An important work is reported in [14] in which the authors
conceptually discussed the impact of different types of attacks
on VoIP infrastructure. They have conceptually identified
exploitable server resources, such as memory, CPU usage and
bandwidth and presented abstract guidelines to ensure SIP
servers’ robustness under different attack scenarios. But they
paid no attention to empirically analyze the performance hit
of SIP servers under attack. The authors of [15] summarize
the features of vulnerability analysis tools available for VoIP.
Similarly, the authors of [16] suggest using a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) solution to circumvent attacks on a SIP server.
The authors did not discuss how their scheme is resilient
against DoS attacks. The authors of [7] have experimentally
evaluated the SIP proxy (OpenSER), using micro-benchmarks,
and analyzed the performance of OpenSER as a function of
selecting different configuration modes of the server. They
have also ignored robustness analysis of SIP servers against
different types of DoS attacks. The authors of [17] proposed
a stateful method of detecting flooding attacks against SIP
servers. While the authors of [18] proposed a two layer DoS
pervention architecture that handles both SIP flooding and
malformed packet attacks on a standard VoIP network.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have evaluated robustness of four well-
known SIP servers against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
We defined metrics to quantify robustness of a SIP server
under DoS attacks. We have also developed a SIP vulnerability
analysis tool and integrated it into our real test bed. We have
done experiments on it to answer four questions raised in
Section I: (1) What is the impact of simple DoS attacks on
the performance of SIP proxy servers?, (2) Do existing well-
known SIP servers are robust against emerging threats?, (3)
What is the ‘breaking point’ of a SIP server after which a
complete DoS occurs? and (4) How realistic is the threat
of malformed packets attack? We have summarized results
in Table II. The important conclusion is that existing well-
known SIP servers can be knocked out of service by launching
simple INVITE flood attacks. However, servers like PartySIP
and OpenSBC are more robust (see Table II) compared with
TABLE II
BREAKING POINT AND VULNERABILITY OF SIP SERVERS
SIP Servers Breaking Point Parsing Vulnerability
MjServer 200 INVITE/sec No
OpenSER 500 INVITE/sec No
OpenSBC 4000 INVITE/sec Yes
PartySIP 8000 INVITE/sec No
OpenSER and MjServer. Note that the breaking points of
MjServer, OpenSER, PartySIP and OpenSBC are 200, 500,
4000, 8000 INVITE packets/sec respectively. We have also
shown that how an intelligently crafted malformed packet
crashed OpenSBC. This emphasizes the need for developing
robust SIP parser by following secure coding standards. The
practice is followed in OpenSER, PartySIP and MjServer.
Our study justifies the need to implement efficient realtime
SIP Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which can protect a
SIP VoIP infrastructure from emerging SIP threats. In future,
we plan to extend our robustness analysis on SIP severs by
testing them in presence of specialized SIP based IDS/IPS
and by providing the insights about the architecture, coding
techniques and design of different SIP servers which inherently
make them resilient to DoS attacks.
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